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ABSTRACT 
The 21st century has been defined by the rise of China as an economic 
superpower. The intensity of its engagement in the international arena has aroused 
interest in academia and the media, especially as it relates to its activities in the 
rest of the developing world. Sino-African relations have been a rapidly 
increasing area of focus for Chinese political and economic actors since 1990. 
Studies thus far have largely focused on assessing China’s motivations and to 
highlight the potential for the nation’s involvement in Africa to derail international 
efforts to increase transparency, governance and to foster democracy.  
 
In this paper, we choose instead, to adopt the African perspective. We 
acknowledge the extensive work published primarily by developmental 
organizations on the type of political reform necessary in Africa. In our effort to 
contribute positively to the body of work on Sino-African relations, we adopt an 
intentionally apolitical lens in constructing our policy framework to achieve our 
objective – inclusive growth and development.  
 
In the first section of our paper, we critically examine China’s approach to many 
nations in the African continent – the Angola model. We evaluate the model’s 
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benefits and drawbacks, contrasting it to other developmental approaches that 
have been attempted in Africa. Our policy framework has three pillars - public 
services and infrastructure, economic diversification, and knowledge and 
technology transfer.	 We provide a theoretical basis for the choice of these pillars, 
as well as our rationale for selecting these areas as particularly suitable to 
optimization given China’s approach to Arica.  
 
In the second section, we leverage case studies as tools to present our 
recommendations - focusing on Angola and Zambia. Such an approach presents 
two advantages. First, in our research, we worked to identify countries with 
characteristics such as resource abundance and weak or nascent institutional 
structures. Many other countries in the African continent share such features. 
Second, in making specific policy recommendations for Angola and Zambia, we 
outline our rationale and the necessary conditions for these policies to succeed. 
This provides opportunity for future research to investigate applicability of these 
policies to other nations in the African continent.  
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"Policy proposals to select African States to optimize benefits  
from China's interest and investment in Africa" 
 
Introduction 
Relations between China and Africa have captured a lot of attention in the 
recent decade. In 2015, trade between China and Africa amounted to USD 385 
billion, a tenfold increase as compared to the amount in 2005.1 Views towards 
China’s engagement in the African continent are mixed and manifold: some 
believe that there are mutual benefits from Sino-African cooperation, while others 
are skeptical and see China’s involvement as largely extractive to fuel domestic 
growth.  
 
China has been engaged in Africa for over a century. Academic interest in 
the relationship has intensified as trade relations increased exponentially from the 
end of the 20th century. This period coincided the rise of China as a global 
economic powerhouse. China in Africa, in the twenty first century, is markedly 
different from other foreign investors and trading partners in the continent for its 
commitment to non-interference in the political agenda.  This has served as 
additional incentive for African States to largely welcome China’s growing 
																																																								
1 “China Africa Trade Approaches $300 billion in 2015,” 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/10/content_22417707.htm, China Daily, 
November 20, 2015, accessed July 24, 2016 
	 2	
presence in the region. The lens adopted by political scientists when analyzing 
Sino-African relations has ranged from “South-South” cooperation to a debate on 
whether China can be viewed as a neo-colonial power in Africa. As we discuss in 
later sections of this paper, the media has also focused on the perils of China’s 
unwillingness to impose political conditions to ‘reform’ authoritarian regimes 
when extending assistance.  
 
The strong economic performance of many African nations, since the late 
1990s, on the other hand, is merely recorded as a data point. While this paper does 
not attempt to suggest or prove direct causality of China’s involvement in Africa 
and hence this outperformance, it concerns itself with the African perspective. 
Understanding China’s motivations for involvement in Africa, this paper aims to 
formulate specific policy recommendations for select African nations – Angola 
and Zambia, to optimize benefits from China’s interest and desire to invest in 
these nations.  
 
This paper begins with an overview of Sino-African relations highlighting 
the primary spheres in which Sino-African relations impact African nations. We 
leverage patterns observed in the evolution of the relationship between China and 
	 3	
Africa, to identify expected themes and their relative importance in the medium 
term – i.e. until 2025. Having established context, we discuss our research 
question and our choice of case studies – countries for which we design policy 
recommendations. We then discuss China’s approach in Africa, termed the 
Angola model, elaborating upon its key features and providing a critical 
examination of its benefits and drawbacks for African nations. We also compare 
and contrast this approach to that of institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank who espouse the Washington 
Consensus framework. Upon establishing the suitability of China’s model for 
Africa, we set up our policy framework.  We identify and examine spheres within 
which Angola and Zambia can optimize benefits accrued from China’s interest in 
the nations’ resources and marketplace. We conclude by reiterating the 
importance of this window of opportunity for Africa, and briefly discuss the 
potential for future research to extend these policy recommendations to other 
African nations, which engage with China. 
 
Overview of Sino-African Relations 
This section provides an overview of China’s involvement in Africa, highlighting 
key themes. We begin this section by compiling a visualization that depicts our 
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understanding of the evolution of different dimensions of Sino-African relations 
since 1949. Three key themes are evident. - Politics & Diplomatic Engagement, 
Trade & Investment. These can be seen as objectives when viewed from China’s 
perspective, as the driver of relations, and as benefits from an African viewpoint.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Different Dimensions of Sino-African Relations 
 
Source: Compiled by authors of this paper based on sources in the bibliography 
 
Before 2000, China’s involvement in Africa undulated as a result of major 
domestic events and priorities – such as dealing with the economic costs of the 
Great Leap Forward or Deng Xiao Peng’s focus on the economy from the 1970s 
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as he introduced economic reforms. Yet, consistency is seen in diplomatic 
engagement initiated by China with key African nations. While mutual respect has 
remained a constant theme in Sino-African relations, Chinese involvement in the 
continent has been marked by a commitment to non-interference since the end of 
the twentieth century. Interactions in the political sphere today, between China 
and Africa are focused on fostering and protecting trade, development and 
investment. From the 2006 Forum(s) for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
China has demonstrated an increased commitment to physical investments in 
African nations. The China African Development Fund was established post the 
2006 forum to finance these projects.2  
 
In the 2010 forum, the Chinese politburo’s desire to focus on “sustainable” 
common development was evident with a number of projects pledged in the 
energy sector and agrotechnology.3 An increase was also seen in partnerships in 
research and knowledge exchanges in the science, technology and education 
sphere.  While a slight downtick in intensity is seen as a result of the Global 
Financial Crisis and the slowdown in China, the nation has remained unwavering 
																																																								
2 http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/t952503.htm. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's 
Republic of China 
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, “Forum on China Africa 
Cooperation Sharm Al Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), 12 November 2009, accessed 16 June 
2016, http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm. 
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in delivering on its committed financial assistance and projects in the continent. 
As we look beyond 2015, an understanding of China’s stated objectives and goals 
has determined our chosen areas of focus as we formulate policy 
recommendations. We expect trade and investment to dominate relations between 
China and Africa, with investments in infrastructure and manufacturing sites. 
Specific focus sectors and hence areas of opportunity for select African 
governments are examined in greater detail in the sections that follow.  
 
The Past – Before 2000 
Trade between China and Africa has a very long history – it began during 
the Medieval times, and also in the Ming Dynasty and Zheng He4, who made 
voyages rounded the coast of Somalia and down to the Mozambique Channel with 
his fleet to spread Chinese culture and its strength. Closer relations between the 
two continents began since 1949, the year when the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was established.  
 
Contemporary relations between China and Africa was furthered in the late 
1950s, when China signed the first official bilateral trade agreement with a few 
																																																								
4 Timothy Rich and Sterling Recker, “Understanding Sino-African Relations: Neocolonialism or A 
New Era?” Journal of International and Area Studies 20, no. 1 (2013): 61-76 
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African countries; while modern political and economic relations began with Mao 
Ze-dong. The year 1956 also marked another important moment of Sino-African 
ties. It was the year in which China establish diplomatic relations with Egypt.5 
Since then, China’s involvement in Africa started to increase, mainly because of 
the shared ideological belief in anti-colonialism and the recognition of the 
importance of economic incentives.6  During this period – the 1950s – China 
backed a number of liberation moments seeking to free African countries, such as 
Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa, from colonialism. In other words, China has 
had relations with Africa for more than a 100 years. Some early examples of 
assistance China extended to Africa include that in building match plant and 
cigarette plant in Guinea in 1960, experimenting on sugarcane and tea in Mali in 
1961-1962, and constructing the 1,860 km TAZARA Railway which links Zambia 
and Tanzania in 1970-1975.7 
 
Financial engagement of China in Africa increased dramatically after it 
embarked upon its domestic reforms in the 1990s. The country has made large 
investments in Africa’s infrastructure. In one of the World Bank Working Papers, 
																																																								
5 JianJun Tu, “Sino-African Relations: Historical Development and Long-Term Challenges,” 
China: An International Journal 6, no 2 (2008): 330-343 
6 Tu, J.  
7 Xiaoyun Li, “China’s Foreign Aid And Aid To Africa: Overview,” OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/40378067.pdf (accessed June 16, 2016) 
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it is reported that the Chinese involvement in Africa mounted up to USD 44 
billion in the past decades, financing hundreds of infrastructure projects.8 
 
The Present – Between 2000 and 2015 
In the new millennium, there has been remarkable growth in China’s 
presence in Africa. China’s assistance to Africa continued to soar between 2000 
and 2015. Unlike the relations between the West and African, where aid is the 
priority 9 , China adopts a model that does not merely involve grants for 
humanitarian purposes. Instead, China’s approach creates opportunities for 
employment for the local population and prospects for African private enterprises 
to amass expertise.  China invests in infrastructure in Africa; in return, Africa 
repays with its resources. In other words, trade is highly intertwined with 
investment. Below is a table which shows the amount in trade between China and 
Africa up till 2015. 
																																																								
8 “Building Bridges: China’s growing role as infrastructure financier for Sub-Saharan Africa,” The 
World Bank, 2009, 5, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2614/480910PUB0Buil101OFFICI
AL0USE0ONLY1.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed June 16, 2016)  
9 Fredline, M’Cormack-Hale and Amadu Jacky Kaba, “The Obama administration and U.S.-Africa 
relations,” The Western Journal of Black Studies 39, no. 3 (2015): 238-255 
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Figure 2: Amount involved in trade between China and Africa10 
Year $ 
1980 USD 1 billion 
1999 USD 6.5 billion 
2000 USD 10 billion 
2005 USD 39.7 billion 
2006 USD 55 billion 
2008 USD 106 billion 
2010 USD 114 billion 
2011 USD 166.3 billion 
2012 USD 198.5 billion 
2013 USD 248 billion 
2015 USD 385 billion 
Source: Financial Times 
Over the period of 2000 to 2015, some of the major aid projects that China 
invested in Africa are summarized in the following table. 
Figure 3: Major Aid Projects by China in Africa11 
 
Year of 
completion 
Project  Country Assistance 
2009 Merowe Dam Sudan USD 3.5 billion 
2011 Zimpeto Stadium Mozambique USD 57 million 
2011 Dakar National Grand 
Theatre 
Senegal USD 34 million 
2012 African Union Conference 
Centre and Office 
Complex 
Ethiopia USD 200 million 
Source: China Daily 
																																																								
10 Valenrina Romei, “China and Africa: trade relationship evolves,” Financial Times, December 3, 
2015,  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c53e7f68-9844-11e5-9228-
87e603d47bdc.html#axzz4FKwblouM (accessed July 24, 2015) 
11 China Daily, “8 major aid projects by China in Africa,” China Daily, May 6, 2014 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014livisitafrica/2014-05/06/content_17487172.htm   
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There are several political and economic structures that foster and 
strengthen the economic ties. The first one being the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), a political institution between the People’s Republic of 
China and the states in Africa which was established in 2000, providing ‘a 
diplomatic platform through which strategic large-scale investment deals are 
facilitated’.12 A summit is held every three years, where foundational principles 
governing Sino-African relations are reiterated, new themes unveiled and 
additional financial commitments announced.  
 
In 2006, in the Beijing Summit, the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan and a 
Declaration, which calls for strategic partnership with the aim to foster mutual 
trust and economic cooperation, was unanimously adopted 13 . The Chinese 
government announced eight steps, on trade, investment, infrastructure and 
development assistance, to strengthen the Sino-African relations14. In the Summit, 
Hu Jintao, President of China, pledged to provide USD 3 billion in preferential 
loans and USD 2 billion in preferential buyer’s credits to African countries.15  
 																																																								
12 Lucy Corkin, Uncovering African Agency: Angola’s Management of China’s Credit Lines (UK: 
Routledge, 2013) 
13 Tu, J.  
14 Yiagadeesen Samy, “China’s Aid Policies in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges,” The Round 
Table 99, no. 406 (2010): 75-90 
15 Tu, J.  
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At the same period of time, China’s economy had thrived, with it’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growing rapidly. In 1990, China’s GDP per capita was 
USD 316. Yet, in 2000, it tripled to USD 955. China’s GDP per capita soared 
further to USD 4,515 in 2010 and USD 7,925 in 201516. As a result, China had 
growing energy needs as its national security interest to sustain economic growth 
and development. The nation began actively participating in developing mines 
and oil wells to secure access to oil and natural resources to fuel its expanding and 
emerging economy, which served as incentive to deepen ties with Africa.17 
 
Growing demand for resources from China was met by very willing 
suppliers in the African nations. This is because many governments in African 
countries welcomed the Chinese approach. The African population also holds a 
positive attitude towards China’s engagement.18  There are two reasons which 
primarily account for the preference of African countries. Firstly, it’s because 
China’s infrastructure projects in Africa are financed by low-interest loans and 
direct financing. Secondly, it’s because over the years, China has maintained a 
‘non-interference’ stance in Africa’s domestic affairs. Thus, it is the economic 																																																								
16 GDP per capita – China. http://politics.ucsc.edu/undergraduate/chicago%20style%20guide.pdf 
(accessed Jun. 28, 2016) 
17 Miwa Hirono and Shogo Suzuki, “Why Do We need ‘Myth-Busting’ in the Study of Sino-
African Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 87 (2014): 443-461. 
18 Marek Hanusch, “African Perspectives on China-Africa: Modelling Popular Perceptions and 
their Economic and Political Determinants,” Oxford Development Studies 40, no. 4 (2012): 492-
516. 
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might of the Asian nation and its non-intervention policy that lures African 
countries.19 
 
The Future – Between 2015 and 2025 
As discussed above, China and Africa have had over 100 years of relations. 
While the millennium began with China focused on resource and energy security, 
we expect the next decade to be defined by a broadening of interests and 
investments by China in Africa. This may include trends such as the deepening of 
industrialization, security and military cooperation, media and educational 
exchanges, and initiatives to ensure environmental protection.20 Other than energy, 
we expect China to also focus on other interests such as food and agriculture, 
which can also contribute to its growing economy and population.21 As China 
looks to become an internationally recognized and acknowledged superpower in 
the coming decade, we expect China’s political engagement to become more 
institutionalized and multilateral, engaging with regional organizations in the 
African continent. China’s recent efforts in this vein are discussed as a point of 
leverage in the case study section of this paper. 
																																																								
19 Tu, J. 
20 Tiezzi, S. (2015). The new China-Africa relations: 4 trends to watch. The Diplomat. Retrieved 
from http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/the-new-china-africa-relations-4-trends-to-watch/ on 19 June 
2016 
21 Rich, T, and Sterling Recker 
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Media Portrayal of Sino-African relations 
It is worth acknowledging how differently the Chinese and Western media are 
portraying and presenting relations between China and Africa. In Chinese media, 
China’s involvement in Africa is presented in positive terms, as a sincere friend, 
as a good partner who helps its African brethren develop. An example is how 
Chinese media reported the TAZARA Rail, which was built in the 1975 enabling 
Zambia to export copper to Tanzania without having to go through a part in South 
Africa. Chinese media focused on the sincere intentions driving China, as opposed 
to the commercial advantages of the project. The continued bias in media in 
modern times, is illustrated by the extremely limited Chinese media coverage of 
labor disputes in Zambian mines, for example.22 
 
In the West, the media presents China’s presence in Africa as exploitative and 
neo-colonialist, stating that Chinese involvement is making poverty in Africa 
worse as projects funded by China reportedly use Chinese skilled labor with 
limited involvement of the local population. In relation to trade, while they 
acknowledge the existence of mutual benefits to both China and Africa, they 																																																								
22 Alexis Okeowo, “China, Zambia and a Clash in a Coal Mine,” The New Yorker, 9 October 2015, 
accessed 3 June 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/china-zambia-and-a-clash-in-
a-coal-mine. 
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present outcomes as being unequal, favoring China. China’s willingness to partner 
with non-democratic regimes, the Western media argues, serves as leverage which 
allows China to take advantage of the African nations to create these grossly 
unequal outcomes. As we compare the West’s approach to China’s activities in the 
African continent we assess the validity of these statements in later sections of 
this paper. 
 
Research Question 
In this paper, we aim to formulate policy recommendations for two African 
nations – Angola and Zambia – to optimize benefits from China’s growing trade 
and investment in these nations. Designing policy recommendations at the country 
level, allows us to gain an in depth understanding of the structural nuances in each 
of these economies and the States. This in turn maximizes likelihood of political 
will to implement and its associated success. We rely on data compiled by 
governmental organizations and NGOs (based in Zambia) for evidence to support 
our policy recommendations. We also recognize two major challenges in 
obtaining data on Chinese investments in Angola and Zambia. First is a problem 
of classification, as commitments from China are directly linked to commercial 
contracts and state owned enterprises, resulting in a mismatch between how 
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Chinese and financial assistance from other nations is accounted. The second is an 
issue of transparency and we evaluate the consequences of this in later sections of 
this paper. We have taken reasonable measures to verify data, on the magnitude of 
China’s investments in selections nations and projects, using multiple sources, 
where available. 
 
Angola is a post-colonial African state, having broken free of Portuguese 
rule in 1975. Since that time, Angola underwent decades of a divisive civil war 
that left much of its infrastructure destroyed. Yet, Angola possesses an abundance 
of natural wealth, mainly in the form of oil.  In fact, Angola’s economy is 
dominated by the oil industry, with oil constituting over 90% of its exports and 
over 50% of its GDP.23 
 With China’s need for energy security in the form of oil, Angola became a 
natural and logical trading partner for China, to the point that some might 
characterize the relationship as one of dependence on the part of Angola. Over 
40% of Angolan exports go to China, while 22% of Angolan imports come from 
China.24 But for all the numbers and dependence, it is important to remember that 																																																								
23 Patrick McGroarty, “Angola’s Boom Fueled by China Goes Bust,” Wall Street Journal, October 
28 2015, accessed 28 July 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/angolas-boom-fueled-by-china-goes-
bust-1446072930. 
24Economist Intelligence Unit, “Angola Fact Sheet,” Last updated July 20 2016, accessed 21 July 
2016,http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1874428371&Country=Angola&topic=Summar
y&subtopic=Fact+sheet 
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Chinese interest in Angola is mainly one based on Chinese energy needs. 
 
 While the relationship has grown to become complex and layered, the 
basic relationship between the two countries stems from Chinese interest in oil 
resources in Angola, which is the primary reason for Angola being a suitable and 
appropriate case study for this current paper. Angola presents as a post-colonial, 
post-conflict, and resource rich nation. Furthermore, Angola’s current state of 
economic development shows a need for resources and investment, particularly in 
construction and infrastructure. Throughout Africa, and in many parts of the 
world, many states share these same characteristics and needs. A number of 
countries have economies dependent on one natural resource, and many others 
have a need for infrastructure-building and capital investment. Modern economic 
relations between Angola and China, which have lasted for just over ten years, 
presents a good example of what can and cannot be attained in an economic 
relationship with China, especially for nations reliant on natural resource wealth 
but at the same time struggling with economic diversification and development. 
 
Zambia is the continent’s second largest producer of copper in the 
continent and is rich in minerals such as nickel and cobalt as well. The desire for 
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resource security drives China’s trade with Zambia, a common theme across the 
two chosen countries in this paper. However, it is not one of China’s top 10 
trading partners in Africa, and hence is not as dependent on Angola on revenues 
from trade with China. Zambia was chosen as the second country in this paper, 
primarily for three reasons. Zambia receives approximately 3.6% of Chinese 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa.25 These funds have been deployed 
towards infrastructure and the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which 
were pivotal to China’s economic success. Thus, it allows us to examine the 
relevance of SEZs for a resource rich nation such as Zambia and China’s ability to 
partner with African nations and firms to achieve comparable magnitude of 
success as in China, through these zones. Secondly, while SEZs exist in other 
nations such as Nigeria, Zambia is characterized by a democratic government and 
has embarked on a focused pursuit of economic diversification. The country 
serves as an instructive example of the ability of an African nation to successfully 
influence and gradually achieve domestic policy objectives through its interaction 
with China. Thirdly, as Zambia develops it needs to manage its transition from a 
largely agrarian society to one that generates employment for the majority of its 
citizens in the manufacturing and services sector. China’s efforts in the 																																																								
25 Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, “Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and 
Implications for U.S. Policy,” RAND Corporation, 35, accessed on 1 May 2016, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR521/RAND_RR521.pdf 
	 18	
agricultural sector – to introduce new technologies and improve yield are key 
contributions to successfully managing this transition. Zambia, for these reasons, 
serves as a valuable example for the majority of African nations which are 
resource-rich and hence need to diversify their economic base, while managing a 
structural shift towards manufacturing and services to develop and augment their 
standard of living. 
 
We are intentionally apolitical, i.e. we do not consider structural political 
changes, when considering policy options for these nations. We justify this stance 
in two ways. First, China has been consistent in espousing its position on non-
interference in domestic political matters in Africa since the 1990s. Thus, we do 
not expect to observe significant changes to China’s willingness to invest in a 
certain country as a result of a political change, structural or otherwise. Hence, 
given our objective of optimization of benefits from Sino-African relations, we do 
not expect government structure to be an influential variable. Secondly, 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank have published extensive literature 
on the types of governance and political reforms necessary to optimize growth in 
a neo-liberal framework. These recommendations have seen low adoption rates in 
many African nations, due to an absence of political will and motivation. We 
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agree on the need for greater transparency and effective governance in many 
African nations. However, we suggest an alternative approach for gradually 
achieving this change. We choose to focus on policies that can be adopted by the 
existing government over the next ten years in the economic sphere. If 
successfully implemented, these policies can benefit the nation in question by 
augmenting prosperity and fostering inclusive growth and development. Such a 
phenomenon is crucial to empowering civil society within a nation, who in turn 
can initiate and mandate improvements in transparency and governance. 
 
Resource Financed Infrastructure (RFI) and The Angola Model 
As one of the selected African countries in the case studies, Angola holds 
stories of China’s involvement in this country that are often viewed as a refreshing 
approach to foreign investment and economic development involving a global 
power and developing countries. China’s continuous rapid economic development 
in the early 2000 forced the country to seek alternative supply of resource that can 
fuel the economy. The majority of African countries, on other hand, were still 
struggling to obtain funding and find effective ways to further develop their 
economy. Recognizing Africa’s needs and endowment, which proved 
complementary to that of China’s, the Chinese government identified an approach 
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intended for the two parties to gain mutual benefit. This section elaborates and 
evaluates the approach brought by China in order to determine a framework for 
the policy recommendation. 
 
Background 
The Angola model is a term that often refers to China’s adaptation of the 
resource-financed infrastructure with a legally-binding framework agreement. 
This approach links agreement of commodity or resources off-take with the 
provision of low-interest loans for infrastructure project for African country. 
China implemented this approach in Angola through the Export-Import Bank of 
China (China Exim Bank) financing arrangement at first. This approach has since 
been used as the template on how resource rich nations could undertake national 
reconstruction by opening up its door to foreign players in development financing. 
According to the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), USD 2 billion financing package was agreed to in March 2004 with 
Angola’s Ministry of Finance where the funding has been used to develop 
infrastructure construction in Angola including energy, road, rail, health, 
education, etc.26 Many of the financed projects can be considered as public goods 																																																								
26 Indira Campos and Alex Vinesola, “Angola and China – A Pragmatic Partnership” (paper 
presented at a CSIS Conference, “Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation,” 
December 5, 2007 
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that would contribute to the development of Angola. Three years later, the deal 
was extended to the value of USD 500 million to increase the existing 
infrastructure spending and in the same year, the two parties reached another 
agreement for a further oil-backed loan of USD 2 billion. Overall, China 
disbursed USD 4.5 billion in loans to Angola to finance hundreds of projects that 
were proposed and approved by Angolan government, while guaranteeing a daily 
supply of oil to China through a joint venture (JV) between Angola’s parastatal, 
Sonangol and China’s state-owned oil company, Sinopec. 27  Similar to the 
involvement of Sinopec in the oil deal, the infrastructure projects could only be 
contracted to Chinese companies. 
 
As this paper aims to suggest ways in which African states could optimize 
the benefit from China’s engagement in their country, it is important to note the 
driving factors of this agreement because it highlights the assumptions for the 
approach to work. The major driving factor of the RFI in Angola is the 
complementary nature of Chinese and African interests.28 In the first decade of the 
21st century, China’s main interest in engaging with certain resource-rich countries 																																																								
27 Martyn Davies, “How China is Influencing Africa’s Development” Background Paper 
for the Perspectives on Global Development 2010 Shifting Wealth (Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2010), 14  
28 Justin Yi Fu Lin and Yan Wang, “New Structural Economics and Resource Financed 
Infrastructure” Pacific Economic Review 21 (2016): 110 accessed February 27, 2016, doi: 
10.1111/1468-0106.12154 
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is to achieve resource security that would support China’s huge demand for oil to 
drive its remarkable rapid economic growth. On the other hand, Angola was 
seeking investment to support its infrastructure project as a part of national 
reconstruction effort after experiencing a decade-long civil war. During that time, 
IMF and other donors from the West would not provide the loan due to a wide 
range of issues including political and governance to African countries, while 
China came forward with a policy that only focused on the economic and 
financial considerations. Although this “no-strings-attached” principle in the name 
of respecting sovereignty provided flexibility for both China and African countries 
in conducting economic transaction, it has been criticized heavily, particularly by 
the West, based on the assessment of equality and the extent of real benefit 
enjoyed by the overall African society. On the other hand, China and to some 
extent, the African counterparts, view this framework as a business or commercial 
transaction where African countries are mortgaging their natural resources for 
funds to develop their infrastructure. This alternative to the Western approach was 
received positively by the Angolan government in early 2000, and eventually 
gained popularity among other African countries as it turns out that such policy is 
more aligned with African interest. 
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Spreading the Angola Model Across Africa 
In the early 2000s, around the same time as the Angola model emerged, 
more and more African countries who found it difficult to secure aid or loan from 
major actors became more inclined towards this sort of framework agreement. 
Angola’s example – of having successfully rebuilt its nation after the civil war, 
was especially attractive. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
agreed to provide access to concessions of cooper and cobalt to China through the 
two countries’ joint venture in exchange with the provision infrastructure, valued 
at USD 6 billion, including a 3,200 km of railway tracks between resource-rich 
provinces.29  The OECD has mapped out a few examples of concession deals 
between China and select African countries, showing the project, type of 
resources for repayment, project year and the total financing amount by China 
(See Figure 4). This map also reveals that in the early 2000, the type of countries 
where China is applying its Angola model. These countries are endowed with rich 
natural resources that have become repayment tools for Chinese loans. 
  
																																																								
29 Centre for Chinese Studies. “China and the Democratic Republic of Congo: Partners in 
Development?” The China Monitor 34 (2008), 4 
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Figure 4: Selected Chinese Concessional Finance Deals in Africa 
 
Source: Frontier Advisory analysis (cited in “How China is influencing Africa’s 
Development”, OECD Development Centre, April 2010) 
 
Assessing the Model 
In order to prescribe policy for select African countries, it is important to 
examine the benefits and limitations of the model. China surely benefits from 
various aspects including the ability to secure resource for driving its economic 
development and the increase of potential investment in resource extraction and 
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infrastructure development. African nations also benefit from the development of 
infrastructure aimed to increase their country’s economic competitiveness and 
empowerment or improvement of the citizens’ livelihoods. This section will 
explore and compare these benefits and limitations in details and as a result, show 
why the model presents potential for African countries to optimize benefits 
accrued from a relationship with a global power like China.  
 
Countries’ aspiration for economic development requires a long process of 
improvements in industry, infrastructure and technology as well as deepening of 
their comparative advantage. At initial stages of development, government 
involvement is critical in this long process in order to facilitate coordination and 
to address externalities. Otherwise, diversification may not be possible because 
private sector may be less willing to be involved in such projects. The RFI 
approach links the two separated supply chains of resource extraction and the 
building of infrastructure, thereby reducing transaction cost.30 Additionally, as the 
resource transaction links directly with the development of infrastructure, the 
tangible results of the construction projects can be witnessed on the ground within 
a shorter time period. This would boost popularity of the existing host country’s 
																																																								
30 Lin and Wang 2016, 110 
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government as the society could see the observable impact of the agreement. 
Contrary to China’s RFI approach, the World Bank conventionally considered 
resource extraction and infrastructure construction as two different sectors, which 
are to be designed and financed separately, and implemented by different 
ministries in the host countries, particularly in many developing nations.31 
 
Another key advantage of the RFI model that supports policy proposals 
presented in this paper is its ability to link provision of public goods and resource 
extraction in a more effective way, which would make public goods more 
attractive to private sector. One way to achieve this is through the creation of 
industrial zones or clusters based on spatial concentration creating a more positive 
economic environment that reinforces further concentration. 32  As argued by 
Michael Porter, this results in lower transaction costs for individual firms and 
higher competitiveness for the national industry as these clusters server as a 
platform to bring private and public institutions together to interact.33 These sort 
of clusters have existed in many parts of the world, although less so in developing 
countries. One country in Africa is often cited as an example and that is South 
																																																								
31 Ibid. 
32 Justin Yi Fu Lin and Yan Wang, comment on Havard Halland et al., “Resource Finance 
Infrastructure,” The World Bank, 2014 
33 Michael, E. Porter, “Location, Competition, And Economic Development: Local Clusters in A 
Global Economy,” Economic Development Quarterly 14:1 (2000) 
	 27	
Africa. South Africa has launched 12 spatial development initiatives (SDIs) by 
early 2000 focusing on agricultural and tourism. Maputo Development Corridor 
(MDC) is one of the SDIs that spreads into neighboring country, Mozambique. 
The MDC links two spatially-based natural resources through road construction 
and it has become the home for a variety of resource-based industrial projects. 
SDIs such as MDC have provided benefit including infrastructure improvement, 
private sector investment and human capital investment especially of previously 
disadvantaged group.34 It is evident that there is potential for African countries to 
benefit more from RFI or Angola model by adopting the SEZs or this spatial 
clusters concept, hence this paper will explore further in the specific country 
section. 
 
The framework agreement and investment contract signed between China 
Exim Bank and Angola’s Ministry of Finance provide other benefits for both 
countries. For China, without a doubt, the country was able to secure natural 
resource to drive its economic growth. This agreement also provides investment 
opportunities for China in the oil fields. One of the concerns that investors may 
have is the possibility for a country to expropriate their property rights. 
																																																								
34 Benjamin Nelson and Alberto Behar, “Natural Resources, Growth and Spatially-Based 
Development: A View of the Literature,” World Development Report, February 7, 2008, 14 
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Nevertheless, an African scholar from University of Namibia argues that, the 
agreement actually provides assurance for Chinese investors against such risk.35 
At the same time, African states that have signed the agreement are also insured 
by China, given there could be a risk of exhaustion of funding to develop the 
infrastructure as promised. China’s treatment of the host African countries as their 
business partners allowed this mutual insurance to be achieved. 
 
Angola, on the other hand, had low credit ratings in the early 2000. That 
created challenges for the government to borrow money from major development 
financial institutions and commercial banks as they would offer high interest rate 
and require short repayment period. China’s arrival with RFI approach in Angola 
offered low interest rate, which is more favorable for Angola. Angola also took 
advantage of the flexibility in negotiating terms of agreement. In the second phase 
of loan disbursement, Angolan government added a clause incorporating local 
element. The clause stated “at least 30% of the contract amount should be 
subcontracted to local companies.” 36  Local regulation also put a cap on the 
percentage of foreign workers as a total of work force, which is 30% except with 
special permission.  																																																								
35 Dunia P. Zongwe, “On the Road to Post Conflict Reconstruction by Contract: The Angola 
Model,” Social Science Research Network, December 23, 2010 
36 Lin and Wang 2016, 111 
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In spite of these economic benefits presented by the Angolan model, China 
does have an image problem raised from the critics against this model. The West 
perceives China’s approach as a new wave of colonialism as highlighted in the 
section on contrasting media views in this paper. In early 2000, when China 
started to set footsteps in Africa, China engaged more with resource rich countries 
as seen on Figure 4. Critics argue that there is real evidence of exploitation in the 
host country, especially when there is doubt in terms of quality and sustainability 
of infrastructure that China was building.  
 
In any country, change in administration could drive a change in its 
domestic and foreign policy. The Angola model would also be affected from such 
change. A change in administration and political structure could possibly result in 
renegotiation or even cancellation of the agreement, which would hinder the 
process and slow down the impact of the infrastructure development. This is more 
plausible if resistance grows from local community in many African countries 
against China’s involvement in the industry. This drawback, however, does not 
only apply to Angola model, but other types of foreign countries’ involvement as 
well. Many have criticized China’s non-interference policy while engaging in 
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other countries. However, in fact, this principle is relative to different countries 
and continent. In recent years, there has been significant political transformation 
in Africa and as a result, China had to adjust its policy approach accordingly. 
According to Aidoo and Hess (2015), Chinese government differentiates its 
approach based on the political structure of the country. In non-democracies like 
Angola, China develops strong relationship with party in power, while showing 
loyal support against opposition forces. On the other hand, in countries like 
Zambia where it has a more democratic regime, China forged ties with both the 
party in power and the opposition. Such approach allows Beijing to hedge risk 
arising from potential leadership change. 37  This reflects China’s pragmatic 
approach in interacting with different government while still upholding its non-
interference policy. On the other hand, reforms demanded by some international 
financial institutions could also exacerbate political change or even unrest such as 
the case of Greece, while China’s involvement in Africa could be insulated against 
this change due to the interconnected nature of economic relationship between 
China and African countries. China’s hedging strategy in the political domain of 
host countries gives itself the flexibility to adapt to political change for their best 
interest. Hence this paper recommends a set of policy for African states to 
																																																								
37 Richard Aidoo and Steve Hess, “Non-Interference 2.0: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards 
a Changing Africa” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44:1 (2015) 107–139. 
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maximize their benefit without focusing on political change as it assumes that 
China is able and willing to adjust and adapt to political change in the host 
country. 
 
Another weakness of the Model that is extensively talked about is the issue 
of transparency. Whether it is the lack of transparency during negotiation or in 
terms of distribution of the fund, China’s record in this aspect has not shown 
significant improvement domestically and more so, abroad. It is a legitimate 
concern as it may undermine the benefit that African countries can enjoy from this 
relationship with China.  It is important to remember that China’s engagement 
with overseas partner countries are considered as business partnership and RFI is 
a commercial contract. There is a self-reinforcing principle where corruption 
would increase transaction cost and makes it less attractive for investment. As the 
funds extended by China are often directly extended to the contractor executing 
the project (often a Chinese State owned enterprise) graft resulting from the 
involvement of middlemen is minimized. A good balance between transparency 
and confidentiality during negotiation is relatively challenging. Any RFI deals that 
are not negotiated in transparent manner will be more likely to receive backlash 
from public and revoked or renegotiated if there is a leadership turnover in the 
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country. This would increase undesirable economic cost to both parties.  In the 
economic sense, perhaps the ability to enforce certain consequences if a party 
breaks a commercial deal would be more important to avoid any unintended cause 
and in turn optimize the benefit. The very nature of linking resource extraction 
revenue directly with infrastructure development, especially where choice of 
contractors executing on the project is constrained, already limits certain level of 
corruption.  
 
On the issue of transparency, other players in development financing such 
as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have already pushed developing 
nations to be more transparent consistently. Civil societies also play an important 
role in ensuring transparency of project implementation hat will affect the 
livability and survival of the citizens. Globally, there is already an initiative in 
place, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) aims to 
encourage open and accountable management of natural resources.38 Zambia, is in 
fact, a member of this initiative. Angola is currently deliberating on whether they 
will join this initiative through the creation of inter-ministerial working group.39 
Although more can be done, it is necessary to acknowledge that over the years, 																																																								
38 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, “What is EITI?,” EITI International Secretariat, 
accessed July 4 https://eiti.org/eiti  
39 Liliane Chantal Mouan, “Can EITI make a difference in Angola?” Publish What You Pay, 
February 29, 2016, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/can-eiti-make-a-difference-in-angola/.   
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Angola has shown improvement in transparency by publishing list of 
infrastructures plan and their cost.40 
 
The Angola model also raises concerns regarding sustainability of 
development. China’s evident economic motivation reflects its priority in income 
and profit. Once China sees that the agreement ceases to be profitable, the benefit 
for African governments may be threatened especially as China may have the 
upper hand in bargaining power. African government’s over-reliance on specific 
industry must be addressed to avoid this issue, hence diversification is one of the 
main goals of policies proposed here in this paper.  
 
China’s image problem is slowly being reexamined as it establishes the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Reuters mentioned that the AIIB 
will demand the projects to be legally transparent and abide to social and 
environment standards that will protect them.41 However, in accordance to China’s 
principle, AIIB will not demand for privatization or deregulation as a requirement 
for loan provision.42 The successfulness of AIIB in implementing this requirement 
																																																								
40 Donia P. Zongwe 2010, 11  
41 Koh Gui Qing, “Exclusive: China's AIIB to offer loans with fewer strings attached – sources,” 
Reuters, September 1, 2015, accessed June 26, 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-aiib-china-
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will become a proof of how China is ready to tackle transparency issues. Such 
progress could signify its progress that may also be applied in its engagement with 
African countries.  
 
The drawbacks that are acknowledged in this section mostly reflect the 
elements of politics and governance. The scope of the policy proposals will focus 
on how to maximize the benefit for African countries given such drawbacks. This 
paper recognized that China’s pragmatism and non-interference policy will prevail 
in the time period that is examined in this proposal, hence the perspectives and 
relevant cases used in this proposal will focus on the capacity of African 
countries. This paper also acknowledged that there are sufficient benefits that can 
be extracted from this model. In fact, the OECD reports even described this 
inventive approach as a “potential game changer”43 . The use of such a term 
reflects the innovative alternative that China has presented to the conventional 
development models.  
 
Other Developmental Models 
The benefits and drawbacks of the Angola model from an African 
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perspective, detailed above, can be supplemented by contrasting the model to the 
experience of many African countries with international institutions such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. These institutions advocate a neo-liberal growth model, 
often termed as the Washington Consensus. Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong 
further categorize the approach advocated by the IMF and the World Bank into the 
Washington Consensus (WC) and Post Washington Consensus (PWC). 44  The 
latter supplements the traditional neo liberal economic approach with conditions 
for transparency and governance, democracy along with the stipulation of poverty 
reduction as an explicit developmental goal.  
 
China’s engagement model in many African nations, of which the Angola 
model forms a key component along with a commitment to non-interference and 
principles of mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, is often termed the “Beijing 
Consensus,” suggesting a contrast to the WC.45 However, China’s approach is 
founded upon principles that were foundational to her economic success – largely 
neo-liberal principles under Deng Xiao Peng. The primary difference between the 
two models lies in the role envisioned for the State in the economic sphere.  
 																																																								
44 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Africa,” 
African Studies Review 50: (2007), 77, accessed 1 July 2016, doi: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27667241. 
45 Sautman and Hairong, Friends and Interests, 78. 
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The WC and PWC advocate unbridled opening of the economy, with rapid 
liberalization of industry and export led growth. It is critical to note that when 
China, who was a late entrant to the region, began strengthening economic ties, 
African nations had been suffering from economic malaise. WC based policies 
had proven ineffective due to exogenous factors, such as fluctuating commodity 
prices thereby hurting export revenues or due to lack of political commitment to 
undertake reforms that would hurt a State’s primary constituency46.  Additionally, 
as IMF programs required nations to scale back social expenditure, basic 
infrastructure requirements remained unmet in order to service the debt burden. 
 
China’s approach to reform its economy, on the other hand, embraced the 
benefits of trade and global investment flows, with strong State oversight and 
control. The State was an active participant in the economy, investing in 
infrastructure and acting as the chief architect of industrial policy. China’s proven 
success was encouraging to governments in Africa for several reasons that have 
been elaborated upon in the preceding section. These reasons serve to explain the 
favorable perception of China’s involvement in the African economy through 
deals based on the Angola model. Additionally, that China’s model is better suited 																																																								
46 Ikubolajeh Bernard Logan and Kidane Mengisteab, IMF-World Bank Adjustment and Structural 
Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Economic Geography, 69 (1993): 16, accessed 18 July 
2016, doi: http://www.jstor.org/stable/143887. 
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structurally to many African nations is also evident. China’s success lies in its 
successful transition from an underdeveloped economy to a developing one. As 
African leaders observe the Chinese example, they see a populous nation that has 
lifted millions out of poverty and build a strong economic base. China’s strength 
lies in its commitment to foster internationally competitive domestic industries. 
For example, Wu Jiahuang, a WTO official’s analysis indicates that China has 
rapidly decreased average tariffs on goods from 43% in 1992 to 10% in 2005, as 
its nascent industries were incentivized to become more competitive. 47  Thus 
China’s example served as a proven trajectory for an underdeveloped nation to 
follow to rapidly become a developing nation. 
 
Other structural benefits of China’s approach are as follows. Firstly, in the 
WC model organizations such as the IMF merely act as facilitators and technical 
experts. China on the other hand, adopts an active approach providing financial 
assistance and implementation expertise, through its State owned and private 
enterprises. Critics of China’s involvement in Africa often raise concerns on the 
tied nature of the assistance that China provides. Especially for more complex 
infrastructure investments, African nations have been found lacking in the 
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requisite technology to complete the project at hand.48 Finally, tied aid is often 
portrayed as a distinctly Chinese phenomenon. However, 80% of all US aid is 
tied, as is up to 65% of Canadian aid, with similar numbers for countries such as 
Japan, Germany and France.49 While in some of these cases, deals may not be 
secured by natural resources conditions benefiting the donor nation economically 
accompany the assistance. It is not the claim of this paper that for African nations, 
tied aid is of no concern as most of the nations’ significant donors adopt this 
approach. Instead, especially because assistance from these foreign donors is 
motivated by a profit motive and economic interest, it is critical for these African 
nations to deploy these funds in the most productive ways. This in turns will 
ensure the ability of the nation to service the debt, while continuing to attract 
additional funds. 
 The structure of the economy in many African nations is similar to that of 
China, where significant divides may exist between the rural sector and the urban 
areas, with the informal sector serving as the bridge between the two spheres of 
the economy. While rapid urbanization is a typical characteristic of a developing 
nation, the State in China has proven effective in its ability to build infrastructure 
																																																								
48World Economic Forum, World Bank, African Development Bank and the Organization for 
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to act, physically, as a conduit for market forces to reach rural centers, which tend 
to house the majority of the population. In the example of Zambia, this paper 
examines the importance of agriculture as such as a sector, and the need to 
connect it to the larger marketplace. In its ability to assume a longer-term 
profitability view and absorb greater risk than private enterprise, the State is 
uniquely positioned to deploy resources to such initiatives. Secondly, compared to 
the operating model of established international developmental organizations, 
China is respectful of the will of the ruling entity to deploy funds as it deems fit. 
This further leads to a greater probability of completion of a given infrastructure 
build, which is also one of the advantages of Angola model. China’s stance has 
engendered criticism from the U.S. and EU for its willingness to deal freely with 
authoritarian governments. Yet, as analysis commissioned by the U.S. military 
suggests, this comparison is against an American ideal rather than vs. the practice 
of free association with non-democratic regimes where it suits U.S. interests, such 
as in Equatorial Guinea.50 Thirdly, China has shown willingness to share lessons 
and structures learnt as it diversified its manufacturing base, through the 
establishment of SEZs and also industrial clusters for example. Chinese firms as a 
part of the ‘Going Out’ strategy highlighted in the introduction are also 																																																								
50 Lloyd Thrall, “China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security,” 
RAND Corporation, 2015, 14, accessed 3 June 2016, 
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increasingly looking to African nations as a manufacturing base, presenting 
African nations with the opportunity to move up the value chain while 
accumulating human capital. The openness and liberalization advocated by the 
IMF structural adjustment programs were exacerbated in resource-rich countries 
in Africa due to steep fluctuations in commodity prices as well as worsening terms 
of trade. As long as these African nations continue to export unprocessed natural 
resources, they will remain extremely vulnerable to these exogenous shocks. In 
light of this, China offers two distinct advantages. It can serve as a market for 
these natural resources allowing for a strong trading relationship. Its corporations 
desire to maintain their cost advantage by investing in Africa as a manufacturing 
hub. These nations are hence confronted with the opportunity to build and 
strengthen their economies as they integrate into the global economy. This is the 
context within which our policy framework is built. 
 
Policy Framework 
Considering the interests of China and African countries, such as Angola 
and Zambia and recognizing the advantage that Angola model brings to a 
country’s development progress, several potential areas are identified in order to 
lay a framework of a set of policy that will help African states such as Angola and 
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Zambia to optimize benefits from the growing relationship with China. These 
focus areas include; public services and infrastructure, economic diversification, 
and knowledge and technology transfer. They have been chosen due to their 
degree of feasibility and applicability in Angola and Zambia. One aspect that this 
paper also tries to address is how African states can gain more from their 
relationship with China at intergovernmental level. Moreover, there is also a 
question of distribution of benefits within the country itself. As discussed earlier, 
one of the criticisms of this relationship is whether the fruit of economic growth 
driven by Chinese loans and investments has only been enjoyed by the African 
elites. Evidently, inequality still exists in African societies. The three focus areas 
that will be examined provide opportunities to address this problem and promote 
the type of economic growth and development that will benefit the population at 
large.  
 
Basic public services and infrastructure are the backbones of a country’s 
economy. World Economic Forum (WEF) Inclusive Growth and Development 
framework identified improvement of basic services and infrastructure as one of 
the policy incentives that have relevance in the inclusivity of growth51. Public 
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services and basic infrastructure tend to be underfunded and undersupplied in less 
economically developed countries. In fact, infrastructure ties directly with 
productivity of a society. Well-developed and easily-accessible transportation 
routes, energy supply and telecommunication will enhance ease of economic 
activities and services. Basic services such as healthcare are an important element 
to ensure workforce that is healthy, productive and competitive 52 . A policy 
recommendation that aims to improve these spheres will benefit the whole 
population as public services and goods can be enjoyed by the entire population 
and not only restricted by a certain segment of the society.  
 
Based on the OECD map (Figure 1), China has shown its commitment to 
help Angola and other African countries to build road and railways as well as 
other infrastructure including energy supply system such as power station. Apart 
from infrastructure projects that are usually given to Chinese companies, Beijing 
has also assisted African countries with the provision of other basic services, such 
as health clinic projects financed through zero-interest loans offered by the 
Ministry of Commerce.53 Although China has proved its contribution to this focus 
area, there is still potential room of improvement and opportunities where Angola 																																																								
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and Zambia can utilize its capacity and optimize the benefit from their 
relationship with China. 
 
Economic diversification in a country is integral, not only for the 
sustainability and equality of development, but also to ensure that the economy is 
not entirely susceptible to the market volatility of specific industries. High 
dependency is a long-term threat especially for countries like Angola that relies 
heavily on oil production. The United Nations publication on Africa published in 
2014, has noted that the World Bank highlighted three major problems in Angolan 
economy. 54  Two out of the three reflect the problem diversity in Angolan 
economy; first Angola is highly dependent on oil revenue and second, the country 
lacks a diversified job market.  
 
China’s economic slowdown and global economic downturn in recent 
years brought up the debate on how African economies can manage the 
repercussions of the downturn on their economies. Without a doubt, China has 
contributed to Angolan oil revenue and the framework agreement allows Angola 
to directly link loan payment with infrastructure construction, which is an 
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important aspect as highlighted earlier. However, the dependency on oil revenue 
still put Angola at risk from price volatility. Furthermore, due to the lack of 
diversification, viable alternative sources of employment do not exist. In 2012, 
The African Development Bank published Angola’s private sector country profile 
and revealed the composition of Angola’s GDP between year 2009-2012.55 It is 
apparent that in the earlier years, oil and gas dominated almost half of the GDP 
composition despite of the significant dropped in 2012. Zambia, on the other 
hand, has acknowledged that diversification is an integral part for its economy on 
the country’s policy-making process. The African Economic Outlook published in 
2014 stated that Zambian government continues to focus its overarching policy 
goals on diversifying the economy and reducing dependence from the copper 
industry56. Furthermore, the issue of diversification has become the main highlight 
of the recently published 2016 Zambian National Human Development Report 
(ZNHDR). The Report urges Zambia to diversify its economy by prioritizing 
manufacturing and agriculture as these two sectors were found to be able to create 
productive jobs faster than copper mining and increase overall productivity, which 
lead to a path of inclusive development and poverty reduction57. This shows that 																																																								
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diversification is imperative for an economy to develop sustainably, while driving 
its economic growth and development from foreign country’s interest. The policy 
recommendations will highlight how diversification can be implemented in 
Angola and Zambia in relation to each country’s capacity and engagement with 
China already in place.  
 
Another important area that has great potential to help Angola and Zambia 
in maximizing the benefit of relationship with China is through knowledge and 
technology transfer. Technology, in this case, is not simply about the tangible 
software and hardware, but also knowledge and know-hows. Just like the other 
two focus areas, there are plenty of direct and indirect benefit in advocating for 
technology transfer. Access and usability of technology influence economic 
productivity in almost all sectors. Sustainability of natural resources can also be 
obtained through technology transfer. Technology transfer can also help to 
improve the livelihoods of people who rely on those natural resources through 
increased efficiency of use.58 This, however, must take into account local contexts 
of African countries to ensure effectiveness59. The effectiveness of technology 																																																																																																																																																							
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transfer shall reflect, the needs of the less privileged citizens of the country and 
the ways in which the country can leverage on existing policy instrument60, in this 
case China’s Angola model approach. Technology transfer, especially the 
hardware, requires a solid funding to support its implementation. More 
importantly, capacity building initiatives, training and other infrastructure must be 
financed well enough to help facilitate the technology transfer. Therefore, 
assessment of appropriateness of the technology in question is integral especially 
prior to the execution of the project.  
 
China, in fact, has tremendous influence in this aspect throughout the rest 
of Africa since the trend of South-South cooperation in technology transfer flow 
has been increasing. Zambia is an example of an African country that has enjoyed 
the benefit of technology from China, especially in its agricultural sector. Yet, the 
country still has a lot of potential to gain in this area based on its framework 
agreement with China. The policy recommendations made in this paper, consist of 
specific examples where such transfers have been effective, and delve into the 
importance of productivity improvements in the primary sector. 
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This paper does not intend to measure changes of key indicators for each 
of the policy approach. However, it recognizes some metrics that are most 
appropriate to continually measure effectiveness of policy recommendations, 
Aspects such as countries’ ability to pay debt, credit rating, income inequality 
measured by Gini coefficient and GDP growth may reflect the condition of the 
country that would be affected by the three focus areas in this policy 
recommendation. But it is also important to recognize that there are other 
significant factors that contribute to the result of such measures apart from just the 
degree or extent China’s investment or other involvement in a host country. These 
outcomes can be measured, with the strength of causal mechanisms evidenced 
through extensive regression, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 The Angola model is considered as an initial ground for a type of 
relationship between China and select African countries. The policy proposal will 
adapt lessons learnt from the resource for infrastructure approach, utilize the three 
focus areas and customize the approach based on the uniqueness of each country. 
The three focus areas comprise of long term public and social investment to 
ensure sustainability of economic growth and development, promote greater 
equality of opportunity within the country and optimize the benefit of relationship 
between African countries in China. 
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Case Studies and Policy Recommendation 
Case Study A: Angola 
The China-Angola relationship in context 
Angola’s History 
From the 16th century through to 1975, Angola was a colony of Portugal. 
Its fight for independence began in the 1950s, and saw years of conflict against 
the ruling Portuguese regime until 1974. During this time, several groups in 
Angola were active in the fight against the Portuguese regime. Principally, they 
were the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Carnation Revolution of 1974 in Portugal 
started the process of Portuguese decolonization in its African colonies, including 
Angola, and in 1975, Angola become an independent state. 
 
Independence did not bring peace and wealth to Angola. The country 
promptly entered an era of civil war, with the MPLA and UNITA groups from the 
colonial period becoming rivals and the main combatants in a conflict that 
embroiled the country. The Angolan Civil War is generally characterized as 
conflict for power between the groups, but also complicated by the backdrop of 
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the Cold War. A number of outside governments attempted to intervene or assist in 
the conflict, including the Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, and China. 
 
China’s Historical Involvement in Angola 
To the extent that China was involved in the early part of the Angolan 
Civil War, it is generally regarded as a mistake. At the time, the Chinese 
government supported the UNITA movement, as did the South African 
government.61 The Soviet government, on the other hand, supported the opposing 
MPLA movement, at a time when Sino-Soviet relations were rather poor. For two 
reasons, China’s involvement turned out to be a poor decision. First, the FNLA 
ended up on the losing side. Second, the act of associating with the racist white-
minority government of South Africa was heavily criticized.62  Of course, the 
whole intervention seemed to run counter to China’s own principles of non-
interference. 
 
China was able to recover and normalize relations with Angola in 1983, 
but the interaction between the two nations was not strong, until 2002. The end of 
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the Angolan Civil War brought about stability for Angola and opportunity for 
outside countries. After a period of civil war, Angola was in desperate need of 
infrastructure, as roads were in disrepair, bridges were destroyed, and sewage 
waste was not being disposed of properly.63 
 
Angola Today 
From 1979 onwards, the ruling party of the MPLA has been in control of 
the state government, and the same has remained true since the end of the civil 
war. The head of state, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has been in power for that same 
period of time, and continues to be the leader today. The country’s constitution 
describes a government with three branches of government, that of legislative, 
executive, and the judiciary. Since 1992, Angola has theoretically been a 
multiparty democracy, but for most practical purposes, the Angolan government 
remains a centralized one-party government, ruled by President dos Santos and 
the MPLA. 
 
Because of this setup, scholars have described Angola as a strong “weak 
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state.”64  Much of the state bureaucracy is weak and in disarray. Poverty and 
inequality is very high, especially between geographical regions. But at the same 
time, the MPLA ruling party has a strong hold on the economic and political 
workings of the country, with the ability to regulate social relationships and 
control the extraction of resources.65 State bureaucracy is generally seen as weak, 
perhaps by design, so as to keep the political elites in control without fear of 
alternative power centers developing in other parts of government. Perhaps the 
only exception to the rule of weak bureaucracy is the state-owned enterprise of 
Sonangol, the national oil company of Angola. 
 
Sonangol, up until very recently, had a wide-ranging portfolio of duties 
and responsibilities that made it a powerful player in Angola’s political and 
economic spheres. In addition to the exploration and exploitation of oil in Angola, 
it also had regulatory powers with respect to the oil industry, as it could organize 
oil auctions, sign production sharing agreements, and exercise rights of first 
refusal any time a foreign oil venture was looking to sell its stake in an Angola oil 
field.66 All oil companies looking to operate in Angola had to cooperate with 
Sonangol through the use of a joint venture entity or by signing a production 																																																								
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sharing agreement. 67  Certainly, government regulators had a role to play, in 
particular the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum, but Sonangol 
was generally seen as the center of the oil industry in Angola. 
 
In recent months, Sonangol has seen its wide-ranging powers and 
responsibilities, pared back by the government, in a recent restructuring that 
creates new agencies to oversee regulation and administration. How that will 
reshape the politics and oil sector at large remains to be seen. 
 
Modern China-Angola Relations 
The turning point in China-Angola relations began in 2002. At the time, 
Angola was in need of financial loans to rebuild the country. The IMF was an 
option, but the terms and conditions of their loans required political reform and 
more transparency from the Angolan government. These conditions were too 
restrictive for Angola, at a time when it was just emerging from civil war. The 
terms set by the IMF were similar to other loans that Angola had taken in the past. 
China offered an alternative. 
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The terms of the loan offered by the China Exim Bank, of two billion USD 
with a seventeen-year repayment period and a five-year grace period, was 
seemingly a panacea to the other deals being offered. The interest rate attached to 
the loan was LIBOR plus 1.5%. The loan would be paid back by the proceeds 
from oil sales made by Angola over the term. Additionally, the line of credit was 
to be used entirely for infrastructure building in Angola.68  
 
This is not to say that China was the only lender to Angola. Over the years, 
prior to and after 2002, Angola had been the recipient of numerous loans and 
grants from third-party governments and their banks. However, around that time, 
because Angola’s credit rating was much lower due to the recent end of the civil 
war, it was difficult for Angola to secure terms that were better than what most 
western financial institutions were willing to offer. For the most part, those loans 
would be made at the interest rate of LIBOR plus 2.5%, with five-year repayment 
periods. Certain institutions, depending on their nature and role in the world, 
would also request political reforms or greater transparency, and in some cases, 
budget cuts and austerity measures. 
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Policy Recommendation 
The Oil for Infrastructure Framework 
China’s offer through the Exim Bank was ultimately a more attractive 
offer for the Angolan government. Through these loans, China was able to build 
hospitals, irrigation systems, and roads.69 For the next three years, additional loans 
were made through the same framework, to the amount of $4.5 billion.70 Another 
credit line to the Angolan government was announced in July of 2010. 
 
Because the loan is for infrastructure, it is reasonable to ask how the 
money is used and who is involved in the construction process. And though the 
term oil-for-infrastructure has been used interchangeably, it is not in fact, an in-
kind transaction. Barrels of oil are not shipped to the China Exim Bank. Nor are 
the loans simply given as cash to the Angolan government free of checks and 
conditions.71 Instead, the loan is guaranteed by proceeds of oil sales, which are 
deposited into the borrower’s account at the lending institution.72 Typically, a 
specified amount of oil is sold to a Chinese oil company. For example, the terms 
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of the first loan in 2004 stipulated that the oil would be sold to the China 
International United Petroleum and Chemicals Co. Ltd., a part of Sinopec Group. 
That Chinese oil company then deposits the money for oil purchase into the 
borrower’s account at the lending institution. In turn, it has generally been found 
that Chinese oil companies operating overseas have little to no obligation to ship 
the purchased oil back to China, and instead can sell wherever they can find the 
best price.73 
 
In turn, infrastructure building is performed by contractors, and for the 
majority of the time, the contractor is of Chinese origin. Where the company 
contracted for the infrastructure project is Chinese, payment is usually made 
directly by the China Exim Bank, and the contract amount is written down against 
the line of credit that was made.74 In this way, the risk of corruption and patronage 
on the part of the Angolan government agencies is reduced, as most of the 
payments take place only between the Chinese organizations themselves. 
 
Because the infrastructure building is done mostly by Chinese 
corporations, it is also the case that most of the equipment, materials, and labor is 
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also provided from Chinese sources.75 In fact, the financing conditions on China 
Exim Bank loans tend to state that a minimum of fifty percent of project 
procurement must come from China itself.76 
 
Labor in Infrastructure Building 
The value added dimension of local Angola labor has been a point of 
contention. One would assume that using local labor would be a cheaper and more 
efficient avenue for infrastructure purposes. However, for a variety of reasons, this 
has not been the case with Chinese infrastructure projects in Angola. For one, 
Chinese labor has been perceived to be more reliable, as they live on construction 
sites and generally have a work culture more conducive to completing projects on 
time. Local Angolan workers are more likely follow typical working hours and 
have families to go home to, thus setting a lower priority on deadlines.77 The weak 
education and training in Angola has meant more unskilled labor, which when 
coupled with the language barriers between Angolans and Chinese, has led to a a 
even greater preference for Chinese workers.78 All this has meant that even if a 
Chinese worker is more expensive than an Angolan worker, companies have 
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judged it to be more prudent to find workers from China willing to work for 
months or years in Angola, at a higher rate of pay than their Angolan counterparts, 
to ensure that deadlines are met and construction quality is satisfactory. 
 
Materials for infrastructure construction have also generally been Chinese 
sourced. In the oil for infrastructure context, construction materials imported for 
the purposes of national reconstruction are exempt from import duties. 
 
It should be noted that though the framework is generally known as oil for 
infrastructure, the Angola model as applied to Angola is not about the Chinese 
government attempting to secure energy. Since 2004, Chinese companies have 
had mixed results in their attempts to acquire Angolan oil interests, with Sonangol 
at times facilitating and blocking acquisitions by oil blocks by Chinese oil 
companies.79 In fact, Sinopec’s best relations with Sonangol occurred just after the 
first China Exim loan in 2004. Subsequent relations and negotiations fell through, 
and Sinopec was unable to expand their equity stake in Angola.  
 
However, Chinese energy security is better met through the diversification 
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of sources, and Angola is simply one small part of that equation. The Angola 
model should instead be considered in a commercial context, in which the gains 
for Chinese banks and Chinese construction companies are the greatest. 
 
Adaptability of the Angola Model 
 The Angola model, and the work of the China Exim Bank, has had far 
more success opening the African market for infrastructure to Chinese 
construction companies. It has provided guaranteed project contracts, a stable 
source of payments, and procurement contracts all at the same time. Because 
Angolan workers, companies, and procurement is often cut out of the construction 
cycle, Chinese companies are at a great advantage. 
 
As mentioned before, the Angola model is not unique to China’s dealings 
with Africa.80 However, the model itself is a good starting point as a framework, 
because of its adaptability. And with the corollary effects of the model becoming 
clear in the Angola context, recipients of these loans are now armed with better 
information and can project how these projects can generally produce even greater 
benefits and spillover effects for the country. This same framework has been 
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applied to different countries throughout the world, revealing China’s flexibility 
and limits within this model. 
 
It is important to note that the Chinese-Angola relationship is generally not 
seen as a long-term strategic partnership. At the current time, the concept of 
mutual benefit applies, but there is also a degree of convenience to the 
association. For China, at this current juncture, it has been said that the national 
energy security policies of the Chinese government dovetailed nicely with the 
profit-making motives of Chinese national oil companies. 81  Should the oil 
companies of China become discouraged by the Angolan oil industry, or should 
the Chinese government have a different attitude toward sending workers abroad, 
then the Angola model as applied to Angola becomes tenuous. 
 
And as a final point, at no point should it be assumed that China has 
somehow been the more dominant player in the relationship with Angola. No one 
disputes that China has greater capital and resources, but that does not translate to 
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China being the driver’s seat. China’s interests in Angola are mainly commercial, 
and Angola has had success with leveraging China’s interest in its economy to 
draw and attract other foreign investments.82 Some scholars have even gone so far 
as to ask if China will simply become one of many foreign states to be used and 
channeled by African elites to further their own political agendas.83 
 
Training Local Labor 
Improving the use of local labor in infrastructure building would provide 
greater economic benefits for Angola in the long run. The main driver of that must 
be political willpower to forego speedy construction, and to instead set 
construction deadlines that give contractors more time. In doing so, the supposed 
limitations of local Angolan workers can be addressed, and allow for deadlines to 
be met with a workforce guided by regular working hours. Furthermore, longer 
projects will make the hiring of local workers more appealing, as the costs of 
overseas Chinese labor will only stand to grow.84 In other words, the longer the 
project, the more likely an overseas company may be willing to train a local 
workforce for the project. However, the political willpower obstacle is not a small 																																																								
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one, as shorter time frames and more numerous projects lead to more 
opportunities for rent seeking, and political elites may not want to forego such 
opportunities. 
 
Extending Deadlines 
 The main impetus for using Chinese labor has been efficiency and time. 
Generally speaking, Chinese state owned enterprises are the only contractors 
available for the infrastructure projects involved, as projects tend to have a 
minimum value of 10 million USD.85 Very few companies are able to manage a 
project that size. While most resources are sourced from China, certain materials 
are processed through factories set up by the Chinese in Angola, a practice that 
began in 2008.86 Certain resources can be found in Angola, and at the same time, 
shipping costs can be reduced on heavier construction materials like timber, brick, 
cement, and steel. 
 
 The point is, the economic benefits of infrastructure projects by the 
Chinese should not be viewed in isolation. Once large enough, these infrastructure 
projects attract a number of related and tangential industries to the area, and a 
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variety of other private companies are needed to fulfill supply chain demands and 
to meet the demands of workers, managers, and companies in these infrastructure 
projects. For instance, as will be discussed below, a possible method would be to 
encourage investment in the value-added manufacturing chain in Angola, whether 
for manufacturing or assembly purposes, to lower the costs of construction. But 
more importantly, the extension of construction deadlines encourages Chinese 
firms to hire locally. With longer timeframes, the investment costs attached to the 
sourcing of local materials, supplies, and labor becomes a greater value 
proposition compared to the current practice of importing Chinese labor and 
materials. Investments in the local supply chain and labor are likely to have long-
term benefits that outlast the infrastructure project itself, leading to a cheaper and 
more sustainable source of materials and labor for future projects. 
 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
 Over the past decade, China has been setting up special economic zones 
around the world, based on its own experience and management with the Chinese 
domestic zones. In recent years, several African nations have invited China to set 
up similar economic zones in their own countries, taking advantage of China’s 
need to move certain mature industries abroad. Angola has not had extensive 
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experience with Chinese Special Economic Zones, but the idea could be floated to 
the Chinese as a policy to further expand and diversify the Angolan economy. The 
creation of a SEZ in Angola would ultimately mean further investment and capital 
from China, but at the same time, it could exacerbate the issue of further Chinese 
labor in a country where local labor could use more assistance. Any movement on 
this policy would require further examination of SEZ’s already in place in states 
such as Egypt or Zambia, to determine the correct model that could benefit 
Angola. 
 
Value of Precedent and Entrenchment 
 The fundamental point made throughout this section is that the China-
Angola relationship has been one of economic convenience. The ideological 
alignments of the Cold War era resulted badly for the Chinese, and today’s 
involvement has resulted in economic returns for China. Naturally, this does raise 
fears of economic downturns causing a breakdown in the current relationship. 
 
 Much of what has been proposed as far as Angola’s dealings with China 
has been predicated on the assumption that the economic conditions remain 
favorable for a continued relationship. But even if economic conditions do 
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change, as they likely will, the key feature of the Angolan model being examined 
is its adaptability. Even if economic conditions change, Angola can look to other 
Angolan model as experienced by other countries in differing economic states, 
and look for policy guidance based on those experiences. Such is the value of 
precedent. The flexibility of the Angola model as applied by China to different 
countries suggests that there is room within the model that is agreeable to China. 
If China is agreeable to similar policy changes with regards to Special Economic 
Zones, labor standards, and infrastructure regulations abroad, then it is suggesting 
that they would be amenable to similar structures in Angola as well. The Angolan 
experience with China has been largely defined by oil and infrastructure, but even 
within those boundaries, there is room for maneuvering. 
 
 
Angolan Leverage 
 Everything noted in these policy positions does rely on Angola having the 
necessary capacity and leverage to change the terms of economic engagement 
with China. There have been commentators who note that China’s involvement in 
Africa as having characteristics of colonialism.87 Angola’s capacity to withstand a 																																																								
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neocolonial power might be questioned, especially if Angola is dependent on 
China and China alone. Furthermore, the downsides to any policy changes from 
China’s perspectives would need to be minimal or manageable.  
 
But for two reasons, there is reason to be optimistic about Angola’s 
leverage. For one, Angola has already demonstrated a tactful ability to play 
against powerful sovereign and financial interests. In 2002, Angola owed over $10 
billion to international creditors, some of which were oil-backed loans arranged 
by reputable financial institutions from the western world.88 In need of further 
financial assistance, Angola first attempted negotiations with the IMF, but those 
loans ultimately fell through due to the reforms being demanded of Angolan 
financial and government institutions. Ironically, China was Angola’s solution to 
pressure for reform coming from the IMF. That may have been the reason western 
banks became more amenable to the arranging of more oil-backed loans to 
Angola.89 
 
Second, large infrastructure loans to Angola have not been limited to 
Chinese sources. Since the beginning of Chinese loans in 2004, a number of other 
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countries have also provided financing for infrastructure, construction, exports, 
and economic diversification, from such sources as Spain, Canada, Brazil, 
Germany, Portugal, the United States, and Great Britain.90 Angola’s search for 
financing has not been restricted by its relationship with China, and in many 
ways, the record seems to show a conscious effort to diversify. On this 
diversification basis alone, Angola can make China aware that its dependence, 
while significant, may not be catastrophic if China were to threaten to abandon the 
Angola market. 
 
 Furthermore, it is important to consider China’s own growing needs. The 
areas of poverty alleviation, energy security, and export markets have been 
highlighted as coming Chinese concerns. 91  Angola helps with two of those 
concerns. 
Case Study B: Zambia 
Overview of Sino-Zambian Relations 
 Zambia was one of the first countries with which the Chinese established 
relations in Africa. As early as 1967, China began offering Zambia loans that grew 
from $7mm to $17mm in a course of a year, when China was in nascent stages of 
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development itself. 92  Since then, China’s investments in Zambia have grown 
rapidly and it is now one of the country’s primary investors and trading partners. 
Since 2006, China’s activities in the nation reflect the major principles stated in 
China’s Policy Paper in Africa published in 2006. 93  China’s areas of focus 
include: 
a) Political cooperation: ministerial visits, knowledge sharing between policy 
making bodies and mutual support in international affairs 
b) Economic cooperation: Trade in natural resources, foreign direct 
investment in manufacturing and agriculture, tourism and finance. 
Assistance is also provided in the form of concessionary loans, 
accompanied by debt relief where necessary. 
c) Human Resource development: Technology transfer, health, education and 
knowledge sharing amongst technocrats 
 
 Politically, Zambia has been a democracy since 1991, with six successful 
elections and multiparty representation. As such a system that is fundamentally 
different from the political dictatorship in Angola, allows us to evaluate the 
benefits of China’s involvements that may be similar regardless of regime type.  																																																								
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 While Zambia serves as a useful comparative case study given its 
democratic political structure, it shares a burden borne by many African nations - 
resource dependence. China’s primary interest in Zambia is the African nation’s 
abundance of natural resources – primarily copper, cobalt and nickel, which are 
inputs into a large number of manufacturing goods and processes. Over 65% of 
Zambia’s exports to the world consist of copper and cobalt.94 Dependence as 
measured by the Herfindahl index shows that Zambia is at a healthier rate of 
dependence on a single trading partner, compared to Sudan, Nigeria or Angola.95 
This is a result of government efforts to partner with China and other foreign 
investors to diversify its economy. Numbers suggest that an imbalance exists 
between Zambia’s dependence on copper (high, as stated above), and China’s 
reliance on Zambia (a mere 2.6% of overall exports from Africa). 96  This 
strengthens Zambia’s effectiveness as a case study to evaluate the importance of 
appropriate policy choices to mitigate dependence on the resource, while 
promoting diversified and inclusive growth.97 																																																								
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 With the procurement of natural resources at the center of Chinese 
investment decisions, many facets of China’s interactions with Zambia can be 
categorized under the Angola model. Concessional loans are provided by China to 
Zambia and guaranteed by commitments to deliver natural resources to China. On 
the other hand, it is one of the ten largest FDI recipients, comprising 3.6% of 
China’s investment flows into Africa in 2010. 98  Apart from securing natural 
resources necessary to fuel the manufacturing sector, two other motivations for 
China’s involvement in Zambia are worth examining. As of 2015, Zambia’s major 
trading partners were South Africa, followed by the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and China. 99  While its exports tend to be produced from extractive 
industries, Zambia imports machinery and transport equipment – i.e. higher value-
added products, thus resulting in unfavorable terms of trade with its major trading 
partners.100 For this reason, Zambia fits into the “going out” strategy of Chinese 
State Owned Enterprises (SOE) as it presents a new and growing market for 
goods and services produced by these firms as well as private enterprises within 
China. Goods and services imported from China have a competitive advantage in 
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the Zambian market due to lower prices as well as mutual tariff free agreements 
that China has in place with many nations in Africa, including Zambia.  
 
 From the 2006 FOCAC, a distinct shift was seen in China’s strategy 
toward African nations with a greater emphasis on mutual benefit and 
sustainability.101 Practically, these principles translated into an increase in efforts 
to: 
a) Establish a global value production chain for goods and services made by 
Chinese corporations, as costs of production rose domestically in China. 
This in turn encouraged firms to establish manufacturing bases in African 
nations including Zambia 
b) Increase technology transfer to Zambian firms who partnered with Chinese 
corporations on projects and Zambian citizens employed in the production 
process, as well as increasing exchange of knowledge and skills across 
industries 
c) Establishment of intra-African networks, a commitment that was re-
emphasized during the 2012 FOCAC by President Hu Jintao, as he 
committed to the development of trans-regional infrastructure networks 
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while encouraging Chinese corporations and institutions to embark on 
such initiatives. 
Initiatives such as the establishment of special economic zones and education 
centers focused on imparting knowledge of optimal farming techniques to local 
farmers are examples of how these principles have translated to projects and 
benefits beyond resource-related revenues for Zambia since 2006. These 
initiatives are covered in-depth in the later sections as we examine policy 
recommendations for Zambia. 
 
 Zambia suffers from an infrastructure deficit like many other African 
nations. Developing nations within Africa have 1/5th the infrastructure of other 
nations in a similar stage of development in the world, such as in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America.102 China’s willingness to extend financing to the nation to 
invest in infrastructure has been critical to improving economic performance. 
Specifically, in copper mining, China’s investments in the country’s largest copper 
mines have resulted in increased copper production as efficient mining 
technologies were deployed and copper prices were at record levels in the early 
2000s.103 A 2010 study of Africa commissioned by the World Bank concluded that 																																																								
102 Africa Competitiveness Report, 43. 
103 Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, “For Whom the Windfalls: Winners and Losers in the 
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infrastructure improvements contributed to up to 50% of the increase in economic 
growth over a five-year period.104 Specifically in Zambia, FDI contributions from 
China are said to have contributed to up to 2% of GDP growth from 2003 to 
2009. 105  More importantly, such investments are seen as fundamental to 
improving prospects for sustained medium and long -term growth.  
 
Policy Recommendation 
 High levels of dependence on a single commodity imply that a country is 
especially vulnerable to price fluctuations in the commodity as well as volatility in 
global demand for the same. Since 2014, the adverse effects of this dependence 
are seen, where growth rates that were averaging at 7% per annum, slowed to 3% 
due to the steep decline in commodity prices.106 In the face of slowing growth, 
this section of the paper looks at three policy recommendations in particular that 
look to leverage China’s presence and willingness to invest in the nation to revive 
growth while increasing broader participation in the formal economy. Zambia’s 
state is actively involved in planning and promoting economic growth through the 																																																																																																																																																							
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development of national economic plans. It remains an outlier, compared to other 
African nations, in specifically including diversification as a part of its national 
economic strategy. Such a commitment to a goal that has historically been 
challenging for states in resource-dependent nations to achieve, has contributed to 
consistency in economic policy. For example, dramatic fluctuations have not 
occurred in government policies to attract foreign investment in special economic 
zones. Corporate tax benefits have stayed largely consistent despite changes in 
majority political leadership. Thus, aligned with the broader framework of this 
paper, these policy recommendations are not contingent on dramatic changes to 
the state’s desired involvement in the economy.  
 
 The similarity of the Zambian state’s involvement in the political economy 
to the Communist Party’s developmental model for China in fact presents 
opportunity for greater collaboration amongst Chinese and Zambian technocrats. 
Three types of policy recommendations are explored in the sections that follow: 
diversification through the growth of the manufacturing sector, investment in 
agriculture in order to effectively manage the economy’s transition to one that is 
reliant on manufacturing and services, and investment in infrastructure and its 
long-term benefits.  
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 In analyzing each of these policy recommendations, consideration is given 
to evolving motivations of both the Chinese and Zambian state. As copper prices 
have plunged due to China’s economic slowdown, and reduced global demand, 
the Zambian state has more incentive to invest in diversification to continue 
receiving taxes and other rents from the production process. China on the other 
hand is faced with rising domestic costs, and as indicated above post 2012, has 
demonstrated greater commitment to leveraging select African nations, such as 
Zambia, as satellite manufacturing hubs. Additionally, it has also shown a greater 
willingness to work with regional organizations in Africa to support the 
development of domestic industry. Visits by technocrats from China to share 
lessons learnt from China’s build out of special economic zones and the provision 
of services by Chinese firms to African companies are examples of initiatives that 
can be leveraged to implement the policy recommendations made below.  
 
Diversification 
 The African Competitiveness Index produced by the World Bank classifies 
Zambia as a “factor economy.”107 As growth is largely driven by unprocessed 
																																																								
107 World Economic Forum, “Africa Competitiveness Report 2015,” 178. 
	 75	
exports of a factor of production (copper, cobalt and nickel as described above), 
this is considered Stage 1 for an economy as it is at the lowest stages of the value-
chain and the production process. For an economy to move towards stage 2, 
where production efficiency drives competitiveness and continued growth, it 
needs to build a services and manufacturing base. African nations that are at 
similar stages fall into two types. In the first category are countries such as Kenya, 
which have focused on deploying resources away from its primary sector directly 
into the services sector.  
 
 In the second category, is Zambia, which has a growing services sector 
designed to complement the build out of the manufacturing sector. The second 
follows China’s economic approach, thus rendering China’s expertise and 
experience extremely relevant to the Zambian state and economic actors. 
Successful diversification is predicated on two factors. First, productivity in 
agriculture needs to consistently improve to allow for the workforce to transition 
into the manufacturing and services sector. Secondly, employment opportunities 
need to be created in the manufacturing and services sector to absorb labor made 
redundant as a result of these productivity improvements in agriculture. Hence, a 
metric used to evaluate the success of efforts to diversity is the reduced 
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contribution of agriculture as resources transition into increasing the 
manufacturing base along with the services sector. Zambia’s experience in the 
agricultural sector and China’s involvement is discussed in the section that 
follows.  
 
 Special Economic Zones are pivotal in contributing to diversification, as 
successfully demonstrated by the Chinese and South East Asian example. Special 
economic zones are a key component of the China Africa Development Fund. 
Established in 2006, post the FOCAC the fund deals with investments that 
promote industrialization in Africa. 108  The policies adopted by Zambia are 
instructive lessons for other nations such as Ethiopia and Nigeria where SEZs 
have not been as successful. Challenges are then identified as areas of focus for 
the Zambian state to leverage China’s involvement in the nation and specifically 
in the build out of SEZs. Government involvement is critical in creating 
infrastructure and ecosystems that facilitate the build-out of manufacturing. 
 
 Diversification is recommended by continuing to collaborate with China to 
develop special economic zones in Zambia. As China’s own example has shown, 
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where local governments are successful in creating linkages between an SEZ and 
the domestic economy – this promotes the development of local industry. In 1979, 
China began with 4 SEZs, with rapid success resulting in more than 100 SEZs in 
various cities across China as of 2010.109 This in turn proved crucial to sustained 
broad-based economic growth. China’s policy makers and its private zone 
operators have hence built significant expertise in designing, launching and 
maintaining SEZs, which can be leveraged by African governments and 
enterprises. SEZs in Africa are either operated entirely by these private enterprises 
or in conjunction with local join venture partners. Chinese enterprises have also 
successfully managed transitions in the operations of an SEZ, where the Chinese 
corporation manages the SEZ in the initial stages with a defined timeline for 
handover to the local partner, once the latter has accumulated sufficient expertise.  
Secondly, World Bank research indicates that China’s initiative to build SEZs has 
a greater chance of success compared to previous attempts.110  This is primarily as 
a result of support (monetary and non-monetary) from government bodies such as 
the Ministry of Commerce, which provides grants and concessional loans to 
enterprises who secure projects within overseas special economic zones. Specific 
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government policies in relation to SEZ’s are discussed briefly as we look beyond 
to 2025. Three specific SEZs are examined to depict contribution to 
diversification of the economy as well as to highlight the relevance of China’s 
developmental model in providing appropriate policy and technocratic assistance 
to Zambian officials.  
A) Lusaka South Multi-facility Economic Zone. This zone was established 
in 2013, 11 companies inhabited the zone with over $120 mm in 
investment.111 This SEZ focuses on attracting firms investing in R&D + 
Logistics. 
B) Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone: This zone 
consists of two SEZs: The Chambishi MFEZ & The Lusaka East MFEZ. 
Chambishi was established in 2007, as one of the earliest SEZs in the 
continent. This zone is in close proximity to Zambia’s largest copper mine, 
which is owned by China’s SOE, China Non Ferrous mining corporation. 
Since 2007, the SEZ has seen over $1.2bn in investments and 8735 jobs.112 
Firms specializing in Copper Mining, Smelting, Mining Equipment & 
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Services, Construction vehicles & materials, chemicals & logistics are 
located within this zone.  
C) Lusaka East MFEZ:  This zone was established in 2010. $40 mm in 
investments has trickled into the zone thus far with 10 companies 
Agricultural Processing & Manufacturing industries. 113  These firms 
process agricultural goods for regional and international markets 
 
 The mere establishment of an SEZ is not enough to guarantee success as 
the experience of other African nations such as Nigeria indicates. Zambia’s 
success presents valuable lessons for other African nations. Firstly, as China’s 
decisions indicate, the choice of location is vital for an SEZ to attract foreign and 
domestic companies to commence operations within them. Secondly, economies 
of scale are created through network effects, as pools of labor that are relevant to 
the industries within the SEZ are established in cities surrounding the zone. While 
this shortfall can initially be dealt with by migration of labor, in the longer term 
the State needs to encourage public private partnerships to foster the creation of 
such a pool. Thirdly, coordination across firms with an SEZ and actors outside of 
it who may have a role to play within the production chain is necessary to 
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attracting new firms to the zone as well as to create local linkages to the domestic 
economy. Chinese firms who have expertise in the provision of these services can 
be engaged to partner with African firms to set up such services.  
 
 By mandating domestic JVs for foreign investors, a State could increase 
the likelihood of technology transfers, which benefit the local population. Transfer 
of knowledge and technology, creates jobs, boosts overall productivity, enhances 
competitiveness and entrepreneurship and ultimately eradicates poverty through 
economic growth and development. 
 
 In creating a relatively stable political environment, Zambia has a 
competitive advantage compared to many other resource-rich nations. This is seen 
in Figure 5, where Zambia is among the most competitive nations in Africa 
despite its lower levels of development. Figure 6 provides evidence of the 
effectiveness of the institutional and policy developments in Zambia as a 
significant increase in competitiveness is seen in Zambia in 2015 versus 2007. 
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Figure 5: Africa Competitiveness Index 
 
Source: Africa Competitiveness Index Report 2015 
Figure 6: Change in the Performance of African Economies 
 
Source: Africa Competitiveness Report 2015 
 
 Zambia’s reputation for ensuring stability of economic and financial policy 
could serve as leverage if and when the Zambian government looks to impose 
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regulations requiring a quota for local labor involvement in construction projects 
or mandating partnerships with local firms for foreign investors. This change 
could be managed by actively engaging with firms invested in the nation to 
discuss the proposed changes to legislation in a transparent manner and 
facilitating dialogue and linkages with industry trade associations and local firms 
who may serve as suitable partners. China and India have successfully 
implemented similar policies in the initial stages of development. The 
development of infrastructure is a crucial driver of success of a particular 
economic zone, this will be covered in the following section below. 
 
Investment in Agriculture 
 Zambia is endowed with 42 million hectares of land of which 1.5 million 
hectares is cultivated annually, while 56% of the total land mass is in fact arable 
and hence available for investment.114 As the nation is endowed with up to 40% of 
the water resources in Central and Southern Africa, availability of irrigation is 
hence not a geographic constraint, but more an infrastructure investment.115 In 
2013, agriculture contributed to 18% of GDP and up to 35% of the country’s non-
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traditional exports. 116  Especially for a developing nation, this investment in 
agriculture is critical to ensure that its rural population does not get left behind as 
growth traditionally largely benefits urban centers. Figure 7 from the 2015 African 
Competitiveness Report below indicates that while agriculture contributes to less 
than 30% of GDP, it employs more than 40% of the populace in countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, including Zambia. 
Figure 7.1:  Agriculture’s Contribution to GDP 
 
 
Source: Africa Competitiveness Report 2015 
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Figure 7.2: Employment of populace across sectors 
 
Source: Africa Competitiveness Report 2015 
  
 Additionally, agricultural products contribute to the diversification of the 
export base. With appropriate government incentives, in the form of well-
maintained infrastructure as well availability of a consistent supply of labor, 
Chinese corporations can be encouraged to invest in manufacturing plants that 
specialize in processed agricultural goods in Zambia. The production of dried 
mushrooms in Zambia within the Lusaka East SEZ is one such example.117 This in 
turn contributes to the growth of the manufacturing sector of the economy and 
allows Zambia to scale up the production value chain, away from exporting 
unprocessed natural resources.   
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 China’s involvement in Agriculture has two significant characteristics. 
Firstly, private sector involvement is higher than state involvement in Zambia. As 
of 2014, Zambia was home to 30 private Chinese farming corporations compared 
to two Chinese state owned farms.118 Both types of farms catered to the local 
market. Secondly, China in adhering to its commitment to invest in human capital 
has established a number of “China-aided technology centers” in Zambia. 119 
These are training centers that the Chinese State finances in collaboration with the 
University of Zambia. In these centers, farmers are trained in agricultural 
machinery, storage and processing of farm produce, soil management and 
techniques of cultivation which improve yields. Focus is on crops that are 
favorable to Zambian climatic conditions such as mushrooms, soya beans and 
other vegetables and fruits. Knowledge is also shared to improve effectiveness of 
life stock rearing. Such centers have been a greater part of China’s investments in 
agriculture since the 2006 FOCAC. China has also shown a willingness to partner 
with institutions such as the World Bank through the Africa Skills Initiative to 
enable scale and share expertise given the nation’s success in augmenting 
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productivity in farms in China. Figure 8 below from the 2015 African 
Competitiveness Report depicts both the valuable nature of expertise given high 
levels of productivity seen in East Asian farms. This chart also highlights the 
importance of such initiatives for Zambia, as continued productivity increases in 
agriculture are imperative to ensuring availability of sufficient labor to contribute 
to a growing services and manufacturing base. 
Figure 8: Cereal Yields by Region, 1961-2013 
 
Source: World Bank 2016 (cited in Africa Competitiveness Report 2015) 
 
 As Zambia develops, it is likely that the contribution of agrarian sector of 
the economy will diminishes over time. However, to minimize development 
differentials between the urban and rural population, such incentives are critical. 
Additionally, as demonstrated in the case of a few of the SEZ’s detailed above, 
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manufacturing of agricultural goods, could serve as a conduit for redeployment of 
factors of production, which may presently be deployed in agriculture, to the 
manufacturing sector of the economy, thereby creating horizontal and vertical 
linkages. In Africa, where smallholder farmers, mostly women, comprise the 
majority, integration into agriculture value chains is crucial to creating capacity 
within the sector.120  
 
Investment in Infrastructure  
 China’s earliest involvement in infrastructure in Zambia was in the 
construction of the Tanzanian-Zambian railway line, which in the 1970s cost over 
$400mm, the largest foreign aid project undertaken by China at the time.121 Since 
then China has continually invested in the basic infrastructure necessary for 
economic growth in the African continent. Examples of projects include 
electricity grids and roads connecting production centers to the market place. As 
of 2010, projects ranged from the construction of sports stadiums, to agricultural 
demonstration centers, hospitals and rural schools. Investment in infrastructure is 
critical to sustain economic growth. As World Bank economist David Dollar 
describes, investments in infrastructure are structurally ill-suited to attracting 																																																								
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private financing, as returns are long term, while initial outlays tend to be 
significant.122  Additionally, political uncertainty, which is particularly acute in 
African nations, but prevalent in most developing nations is priced in, exaggerated 
returns are demanded by the private sector to compensate for these risks. Even 
within infrastructure, certain types of investments such as railways or roads tend 
to be more structurally unfavorable to private investment than telecommunication. 
This has resulted in an infrastructure deficit for Zambia and the continent, with the 
World Bank estimating a $93 billion dollar injection required on a yearly basis to 
build and maintain necessary infrastructure in Africa.123  
 
 Thus, China’s model of state-led development of infrastructure has three 
benefits. Firstly, government spending in strengthening production infrastructure 
has a multiplier effect of the economy. The country benefits from the lower rates 
of financing that could be offered to a government versus needing to bear high 
costs of privatization at the initial stages. Thirdly, it allows for governments to 
structure agreements with foreign players who have the necessary expertise to 
build the required infrastructure. That China’s assistance is often tied in to use of 
China corporations, both state-owned and private, is often raised as a concern by 																																																								
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international media, developmental agencies and domestic groups. However, a 
recent IMF study found that in many developing nations, access to financing is 
less of a constraint than the capacity to implement along with regulatory 
frameworks to support the efforts.124 Thus, China’s expertise can be leveraged to 
narrow this gap.  
 
 An understanding of these structural nuances can also allow the Zambian 
government to prioritize Chinese investment in sectors that most unfavorable to 
private investment. With such a model, the primary role of governance then is to 
ensure transfer of technologies and capability to local labor as well as 
transparency to minimize misappropriation of funds. The role of government as 
well as civil society in this regard is discussed at the end of this section. 
 
 China’s investment in infrastructure across the continent has increased 
exponentially since 2010. It is worth noting that classification of China’s spending 
on infrastructure tends to vary drastically across organizations and sources, given 
the difficulties in classifying “government” assistance. For example, initiatives by 
State-owned enterprises are often classified as “other” types of assistance, 
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whereas efforts by a foreign private corporation from the United States or Europe 
would be deemed as private FDI. To facilitate trend analysis, we rely on Figure 9 
which has been compiled by the World Bank. 
Figure 9: China’s Infrastructure Finance Commitments 
 
Source: World Bank Report 2008 
 In the initial stages of development, investments in infrastructure are 
particularly beneficial, as they benefit the poorer sections of society who may not 
be able to afford alternative means to access the market place. Therefore, the 
potential for inclusive growth increases. Secondly, infrastructure is also essential 
to boost labor productivity. A study across 7 African nations, mapped the 
contribution of ineffective infrastructure to firm productivity. 125  In Zambia, 
infrastructure’s contribution was at 45%.126 In addition to productivity measures, 
																																																								
125 Vivien Foster and Carolina Dominguez, “Zambia’s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective,” 
World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Country Report, March 2010, 4, March 
2010, accessed 3 June 2016, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Zambia-
Country_Report_03.2011.pdf  
126 Foster and Dominguez, Zambia’s Infrastructure, 7. 
	 91	
several institutions such as the IMF and World Bank measure the direct 
contribution of infrastructure investments to GDP. The quality and scale achieved 
as a result of continued investment from China can be measured using this data 
point.  
 
 Spending on infrastructure and other capital-intensive investments when a 
country is in the nascent stages of development outpaces government revenues. 
Hence, most developing nations face the need to borrow from willing nations or 
international organizations. Zambia, pre-1991, borrowed from the IMF, and has 
been the beneficiary of multiple debt write-off programs for low-income 
countries. For a resource rich nation, large price fluctuations are often seen in the 
price of the natural resources. Zambia has been a victim of such price movements 
copper, which has resulted in a larger and significant economic slowdown – which 
in turn may affect ability to service debt. As the bargaining power of most African 
nations against China is limited when renegotiating exist debt commitments, 
consideration must instead be given to ensuring the debt can be serviced as 
required without affecting credit ratings. Two strategies can be considered in this 
regard – request for debt relief and the development of alternate sources of 
revenue to supplement the primary industry. An advantage of China’s approach, is 
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its willingness to consider debt relief in various forms including payments in kind. 
This is in contrast to international institutions who, as discussed in previous 
sections, require rapid liberalization in order to consider debt relief, which most 
African states are unlikely to be amenable to. Thus, while the Chinese model 
proves advantageous in terms of the ease of availability of inexpensive funding 
through the Exim Bank for example, the Zambian state needs to focus on 
diversification of revenue sources in ways discussed above to ensure consistent 
serviceability of debt. 
 
 A final comment on the nature of China’s investments in infrastructure in 
Zambia concerns energy production. For a nation that was plagued by power 
failures up to the early 2000s, China’s willingness to expand its know-how in 
hydroelectric power to other countries is invaluable to ensure sustainable growth. 
Zambia’s 750 MW hydroelectric power plant was built by the Sino Hydro 
Corporation, financed by the Exim Bank.127 It is the third largest plant in Zambia 
and was the country’s first investment in energy infrastructure in 40 years. 
Leveraging China’s expertise in optimizing sources of energy to fuel the 
production process is critical for Zambia to define a sustainable path for itself.  
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Inequity in Sino-Zambian Relations 
 The sections above focus on the areas that serve as opportunity for the 
Zambian government to optimize benefits accrued to them and the population 
from the partnership with China. It is also necessary at this stage to briefly 
summarize the key areas of inequity. The first two are most often cited as 
concerns of the domestic populace. These include: a) the fundamentally extractive 
nature of industries whose produce Zambia exports to China, and invested in by 
China b) that ultimately the African nations serve as additional marketplaces for 
Chinese corporations and c) that working conditions in production facilities set up 
by Chinese corporations tend to be unsafe. China does not operate under the 
pretext of being a benevolent donor in Africa. Thus, that it looks to achieve 
resource security through it operations in Africa and is driven by self-interest is 
not unexpected.  
 
 However, the areas of opportunity for the Zambian state in the face of this 
inequity are three fold. First, in its principles of engagement in Africa, mutual 
benefit is emphasized. Since 2012, China has shown a greater willingness to 
contribute towards increasing production capacity of the African economies. 
Hence, success in creating horizontal linkages, where the natural resources being 
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extracted are refined or processed in Africa, is dependent largely on the efforts of 
the African State to partner with China to create these manufacturing bases. 
Secondly, Zambia has demonstrated the ability of a state that is not the most 
dominant player in terms of trade or investment to shape favorable domestic 
outcomes from Chinese investments, while increasing government revenues. 
Investments in SEZs and hydroelectric power in Zambia are two such examples. 
Thirdly, it is essential to acknowledge that the Chinese goods imported into 
nations such as Zambia tend to be a) goods that Zambian firms do not have the 
expertise to produce and/or b) cheaper than imports from elsewhere in the world. 
This in turn augments purchasing power of the domestic populace. 
 
 China has also shown a greater willingness to engage with regional 
African organizations since 2012. The FOCAC continues to remain a forum for 
China to demonstrate the importance of Africa’s states and leaders to the East 
Asian nation politically and economically. It also serves as an effective forum to 
outline deepening of China’s commitment in Africa and any changes to its 
engagement strategy. Additionally, other regional organizations such as the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have seen increasingly positive 
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outcomes as a result of their engagement with China.128 While these regional 
organizations were set up as early as 1978, China in its push to construct more 
transregional linkages has shown a greater willingness to work with these 
organizations to achieve specific sector-based outcomes. For example, COMESA 
successfully negotiated tariff free imports of cobalt and copper from Zambia, 
which has resulted in increased exports. Additionally, the organization also exerts 
pressure on China to increase domestic production in its member states, working 
with Chinese officials to identify feasible projects and initiatives. Such 
organizations will continue to play a significant role in shaping the nature and 
quality of outcomes of Sino-African nations as economic relations deepen. 
 
 A final area of inequity, particularly relevant to Zambia, is labor conditions 
in mines and plants operated by China. Accidents and threats posed by lapses in 
safety measures undertaken by Chinese corporations has resulted in riots and 
social friction. Since 2002, Zambia has been led by political parties that 
campaigned in strong favor of Chinese presence in the country, and those who 
pledged to extricate the investor from the Zambian economy. Yet, both the 
Chinese State and the different leaders who have been at the helm of Zambia have 																																																								
128 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, “Trade Relations,” in China and Africa: A Century of 
Engagement, ed. David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, (University of Pennsylvania Press: 2012), 99-
127.  
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ultimately continually acknowledged mutual benefits from the ‘relationship’, and 
the need to remain considerate of each party’s concerns. 129  This is Zambia’s 
greatest leverage in achieving gradual change towards fairer labor and safety 
conditions. The democratic nature of Zambia’s government serves as an advantage 
here, where the nation will be forced to address the concerns of the electorate 
should it wish to remain in power and minimize social unrest. China because of its 
determination to not interfere in domestic politics will have to recognize the 
governmental structure as such. Civil society, which is nascent but growing in 
Zambia, also has a role to play in lobbying for equity in labor conditions. For 
example, in a representative poll of African opinions on Chinese involvement in 
the continent, as seen in Figure 9, the majority of individuals see China’s presence 
as beneficial for their respective nations. Thus, representatives from Chinese 
corporations can also be incentivized to work with non governmental organization 
to maintain this positive sentiment, while negotiating a transition to working terms 
and conditions that do not jeopardize Zambian lives.  
 
  
																																																								
129 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “African Perspectives on China-Africa Links”, The China 
Quarterly, 199: China and Africa: Emerging Patterns in Globalization and Development, 
(September 2009): 728-759, doi: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27756499. 
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Figure 10: For Your Country, is China’s Path Development 
 
Source: Sautman and Hairong, African Perspectives, 741. 
Conclusion 
 The characterization of China’s relationship with Africa throughout this 
paper has been one of economics, and the mutual benefits of trade that typically 
result from trade. As such, the relationship in many ways has been one of 
convenience, in that Chinese trade and investment in Africa is only feasible so 
long as it remains profitable for China. 
 
 But at the same time, China is a complicated actor with a variety of 
moving parts and institutions. For all that might be said about its government, its 
decision-making, and its foreign policy, China dealings with the outside world is 
still run through a countless number of institutions with individual agendas and 
influence. Each institution has different economic and political incentives. In 
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other words, a trade relationship with China is not a deal with a single actor, but 
rather, an agreement to cooperate with a wide number of economic and business 
actors. 
 
Trying to determine how each actor will act in the future is perhaps an 
exercise in futility. But instead, it may make sense for an African nation to look at 
previous examples, to determine how the totality of circumstances and 
aggregation of relationships might shape the nation. This paper has taken exactly 
that track, with an examination of Angola and Zambia’s dealings with China to 
determine common patterns and trends in its economic relations. 
 
Perhaps the greatest point of emphasis should be China’s adaptability and 
flexibility in its investment decisions. In examining the different ways China 
constructs deals with Angola and Zambia, and in searching for policy options 
experienced by other nation’s dealing with China, it is striking as to China’s 
willingness to adapt the framework of the Angola model to match an individual 
nation’s local political and cultural situation. The Angola model has been 
described as development model dependent on a nation having the requisite 
natural resources that China desires. For the most part, that characterization is 
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correct, and the economic and financial logic behind that decision-making is 
sound. But the desire for Chinese actors to reap economic benefits in these trade 
relations means that the Angola model is not a one-sided negotiation on the part of 
China. Previous examples of the Chinese using the Angola model as an 
investment framework has shown a layered and nuanced application in each case, 
suggesting a respect and understanding of local conditions. 
 
With that respect and understanding comes room for negotiation.  So long 
as there is flexibility within the Angola model, the model will likely remain viable 
as a development model available for other developing nations around the world. 
Developing nations, in pursuing a new or continuing investment relations with 
China, should not be discouraged by their own geographical or resource 
limitations, but instead should look at the Angola model as simply a starting 
framework that can be molded to fit local needs. 
 
 This paper has not attempted to perform statistical analyses of various 
developmental models, including the Angola model. However, in analyzing the 
ability of developing nations to optimize benefits within this model, it seems 
likely that the Angola model as a developmental model is here to stay, especially 
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with China’s growing influence in the world. Whether China is becoming a neo-
colonial power is beside the point. The more important point is that China is 
increasingly becoming a viable and attractive alternative source of development 
funds and investment, where such sources are already extremely limited. As such, 
developing nations should share in the common goal of not standardizing the 
process of obtaining such development funds, but rather, optimizing such funds 
based on local needs and limitations. 
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